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Abstract This paper examines the economics of catch discarding in fisheries.
To study this issue a simple dynamic fisheries model is constructed. On the
basis of this model it is demonstrated that in a differentiated fishery discarding
of catch may be socially optimal. The paper goes on to show that individual
firms in a free access, competitive fishery employ the socially optimal discard-
ing rule. In contrast, the individual transferable quota (ITQ) fisheries man-
agement regime tends to generate an excessive incentive for discarding catch.
The problem, however, does not appear to derive from the ITQ .system as such.
Rather, it seems to depend on the imperfect application ofthe system to real
fisheries. The concept of a discarding function is defined and it is shown that
at least within the framework of the model employed the discarding function
for an ITQ fishery dominates the one for free access, competitive fisheries.
Numerical examples are provided. Finally, possible remedies ofthe discarding
problem are briefly discussed.
Keywords Fisheries economics, ITQs. discarding, highgrading, discarding
function, differentiated fishery.
Introduction
A fundamental axiom of economics states that economic agents strive to maxi-
mize their objective functions subject to the constraints under which they operate.
This axiom is of course supposed to apply to fishing firms no less than other
economic entities. This suggests that the principal goal of fisheries management
theory should be to identify an institutional {or regulatory) framework with the
property that the efforts of individual fishing firms to improve their fortunes result
in the maximization ofthe common good.
Many fisheries management frameworks induce behaviour that, while individ-
ually profit maximizing, is collectively suboptimal in the sense of being Pareto
inferior. The prime example of this is the free access, common property fisheries
management system.' More generally, it is important to recognize that all fisheries
management regimes, even those specifically designed to alleviate the common
property problem, are subject to the above-mentioned fundamental axiom of eco-
nomics. Irrespective of the particular fisheries management regime adopted, fish-
ermen are constantly seeking ways to increase their individual returns within (and
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Fish-
eries Economics in Bergen 1993. I am grateful to the participants of this conference for
helpful comments. The paper was further improved by constructive comments by two
anonymous referees.
' The basic reference here is Gordon (1954). For a more modem analysis see Clark and
Munro (1982).
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sometimes without) that particular management framework. Under an ideal fish-
eries management regime (which may not exist) these efforts only serve to main-
tain and further the objectives of management. In less favourable cases, these
efforts tend to subvert the intended effects of the fisheries management. In ex-
treme cases attempts by individual players to improve their individual lot will
completely frustrate the objectives of the fisheries management."
The individual transferable quota system (ITQ) appears to be one of the most
promising fisheries management system to alleviate the common property prob-
lem and to improve the efficiency of ocean fisheries."^ Economists have long
suspected that this system encourages excessive discarding of catch. Thus Rettig
(1986) regards the possibility of increased discards as a great concern with ITQ
programs."* The issue is further explored in Squires and Kirkley (1991) and in
greater detail in Anderson et al. (1992).'' None of these references, however,
present a formal analysis of the issue.
ln Iceland where a comprehensive individual transferable share quota system
(ITSQ) has been in effect for some years, opponents of the system sometimes
assert that the system generates a great deal of waste through discarding of catch.
Measurements of discarding in the Icelandic multispecies demersal fisheries have
not produced much evidence in support of this assertion. Thus a recently pub-
lished study'' found no discernible increase in discards under the ITSQ system
compared to the previous limited effort fisheries management system. Under both
systems discards ranged from 1-6% of total catch volume depending on gear and
vessel type.
Casual empiricism as well as economic intuition suggests that discarding of
catch may take place under most fisheries management systems. In fact, some
discarding may actually be economically optimal. This suggests that research into
the discarding issue should focus on the possible existence of excessive incentives
for discarding associated with different management regimes, the magnitudes in-
volved and possible remedies.
This paper deals with these questions. In particular, it attempts to investigate
whether there is an increased tendency toward discarding in an ITQ fisheries
management system compared to the free access alternative and to identify the
factors responsible. The paper proceeds to present numerical examples to throw
light on the potential magnitude of the problem. Finally, possible remedies of the
problem are briefly discussed.
Basic Model
The analysis of discarding requires a model slightly more detailed than the stan-
dard, aggregative fisheries model.^ Discarding, as will be shown below, only
^ Examples are provided by attempts to increase economic rents in fisheries by total quota
management regimes and effort restrictions. See e.g. Scott and Neher (1981), Arnason
(1986) and Hannesson (1993).
^ See e.g. Arnason (1990).
" See also Rettig (1989).
^ See also the other volumes of the National ITQ Study Report, NOAA (1992).
'' See Nefnd um Motun Sjavarutvegsstefnu (1993).
^ As expressed for instance in such classic texts as Gordon (1954) and Clark and Munro
(1982).191
makes economic sense in what may be referred to as the differentiated fishery.
This is a fishery that is characterized by more than one economic grade of the
catch.
Any volume of catch hauled aboard a fishing vessel may be composed of a
number of economic grades. Typically these grades refiect different landing prices
of individual fish, different handling costs aboard the vessel etc. To be relevant for
discarding, the grades must be detectable by the fishermen. This means that the
relevant grades are normally associated with physical appearance of individual
fish such as its size, skin damage, colour etc.
Let the index i refer to economic grades in the catch. Clearly the number of
grades relevant for discarding is at most equal to the number of individual fish in
the catch. Let this number be / and refer to catch of grade / as yii), i - 1,2,..
/. Aggregation of catch over grades yields total catch as y = X,>'(/), where the
summation is over all grades/ = [1, /]. To the extent that different grades of catch
derive from features of the biomass, we correspondingly have xii) representing
biomass of grade /. In order to focus on the essential aspects of discarding,
however, the analysis will proceed in terms of aggregate biomass defined by x =
S,x(i).
Let instantaneous harvesting be determined by the following strictly increas-
ing, jointly concave harvesting function:
y = ^.y(i) = 2,y(e.jc,/), for all / and e,x ^ 0, YiQ,x,i) = Yie.QJ) = 0 (1)
where yO), as mentioned, denotes harvesting offish of grade / and JC the aggregate
biomass. The variable e represents fishing effort. This is assumed to be undiffer-
entiated by grades. All variables are functions of time.
It is worth noting that the harvesting functions in (I) constitute examples of
joint production functions. The economic input, e, cannot be differentiated ac-
cording to grades. Therefore, the vessel will have to harvest whatever grade
composition of catch that is produced by e given the aggregate biomass, x.**
Aggregate biomass develops according to the usual rule in aggregate fisheries
models:
X = G{x) - y, for e,x ^ 0, (2)
where the natural biomass growth function, G(x), is assumed to have the usual
shape with G(0) = G(.V|) - Gix2) - 0 for 0 ^ JC, < x, and G,, < 0.
Finally harvesting costs are given by the strictly increasing convex cost func-
tion:
CE{e), for e ^ 0, CE{0) ^ 0. (3)
Apart from disaggregation of catch into grades, expressions (1M3) are essen-
* The case where fishing effort can be differentiated according to fish grades at a cost is
interesting. This can be modelled in a straight-forward manner by employing a 1 x / vector
of fishing efforts, i.e.. e = (e( 1 ),e(2), . . . , e(l}) and a corresponding vector of cost func-
tions, c = ic(e{\)),c(e(2)), . . . , (•(6'(I))). Again, however, in order to focus on the essential
elements of the discarding issue this particular avenue is not pursued in this paper.192
tially identical to the standard aggregate fisheries model.^ Adding to this model the
option of catch discarding we have the identity:
where Y{e.x.i) represents the harvest of grade / at time t as specified above, /(/)
retained or landed harvest and d(i) the discarded harvest of grade /. A negative
level of discarding would be harvesting. Therefore we assume that dii) ^ 0, all (.
Also, since fisheries are characterized by nonnegative landings, we impose the
restriction /(/) 3= 0. all /, in this model."*
There would generally be economic costs associated with landings and dis-
carding. Let us represent those by the nondecreasing, convex cost functions:
CLm,i), for Ki) ^ 0, all /, CL(O) ^ 0, (5)
CD(d{i),i), for rf(O ^ 0, all /, CO(0) ^ 0. (6)
The CL{) functions represent various costs associated with retaining catch of
grade / and landing it. These costs include the cost of preliminary fish processing
aboard the vessel; handling, gutting, storing, preserving etc., as well as the actual
landing costs.
The CD{) functions represent the costs associated with discarding of fish of
grade /. As discarding is generally relatively easy, these costs would in most cases
be small. Notice, however, that if discarding is illegal or socially frowned upon,
discarding costs would tend to be correspondingly higher.
Given the specifications in (1) to (6) we may write the instantaneous profit
function ofthe fishery as:
Hi) - CE{e) - 2,-CL(/(0,/)) - 2,Ci)(rf(0,0, (7)
where p{i) denotes the price of one unit of landings. The (1 x /) vectors d and p
represent discarding and quay prices of different grades offish, respectively. In
this profit function fishing effort, e, and discarding, d, are natural control vari-
ables. Biomass, x, is a state variable and the fish prices, p(/). are parameters.
Before proceeding, a few additional limitations of the model should be ob-
served. First, note that (2) contains the implicit assumption that discarded catch
does not revert to the biomass. ln many fisheries, especially deep sea ones, this
is empirically accurate. In others, e.g. some inshore crab and shellfish fisheries,
a substantial fraction of the discarded catch survives and is, thus, not lost from the
biomass. A more general formulation of equation (2) allowing for this possibil-
ity is:
i = G{x) - y + a- 2,</(0, 1 ^ a ^ 0, (2')
I
where a is a survival parameter.
"* See e.g. Clark and Munro (1982).
'" Negative landings, however, appear to have an interesting interpretation e.g. in terms of
ocean ranching and waste disposal.193
Second, the structure of the model presupposes that landings, harvesting and
discarding may take place simultaneously, while in reality harvesting is more like
a prolonged affair interspersed with landings. In a later section, this particular
assumption is relaxed and the implications for discarding investigated.
Optimal Discarding
The social problem is to adjust fishing effort and the vector of discards so as to
maximize present value of profits from the fishery. More precisely:
Max r •u{e,d,x-^) • expi-rt)dt (I)
Jo
Subject to: i = G(x) - ^^^(O,
e,d ^ 0,
where r denotes the rate of discount. As before, e and x represent fishing effort
and biomass respectively and d and p (1 x /) vectors of discarding and prices
corresponding to different grades. The functions y, G( ) and IT are defined in
equations (I), (2) and (7) above.
Among the necessary conditions for solving problem (I) are:













where M- is the so-called costate variable or imputed (shadow) value of biomass.
Condition (1.1) is the usual fishing effort efficiency condition in fisheries mod-
els. Thus, (I.I) requires that for positive fishing effort instantaneous marginal
profits of effort, taking full account of the value offish in the sea, should be zero.
Condition (1.2) gives the rule for socially optimal discarding of catch, ln a
slightly more convenient form the discarding rule is:
d{i) > 0 if p(0 + CD^OJ) < CLi{Y(e,x,i) - 0,0 (8)
The left-hand-side of the second inequality of the discarding rule, namely p{i)
+ CDJ_O,i), represents the marginal costs of discarding. This cost consists of two
parts; the unit price of landed catch foregone by discarding, pii), and the direct
marginal costs of discarding evaluated at zero discarding, i.e., CDJ,O). The right-
hand-side of (8), CLj(Y(e,x,i) - OJ), represents the marginal benefits of discarding
(or marginal costs of retaining) catch also evaluated at zero discarding. Thus, the194
discarding rule expressed in (8) is very simple. Catch of grade / should be dis-
carded, i.e., dii) > 0, if the marginal benefits of discarding exceed the costs.
There is a couple of things to notice about the discarding rule. First, since
fishing effort and biomass, i.e.. e and x. appear in the discarding rule and the
vector of discarding, d, appears in (1.1), it is clear that the optimal levels of the two
control variables, e and d, are in general interdependent. This means that the
optimal level of fishing effort depends on the discarding vector and vice versa.
Second, the discarding rule docs not involve jx, the shadow value of biomass.
The reason is that, under the current specifications, discarding does not affect the
biomass in any way. Thus, while biomass influences the decision to discard via
the harvesting function, there is no reciprocal impact. In this sense the stock
dynamics of the problem are exogenous to the discarding rule.
It follows that the decision to discard is essentially static. This, of course,
significantly simplifies the analysis. It is important to realize, however, that this
property is solely due to our specification of the model and does not constitute a
genera! feature of the discarding problem. As discussed in the previous section,
the model specifications contain the implicit assumption that once a unit of bio-
mass has been harvested it cannot be restored by discarding. Thus, discarding has
no effect on biomass. If the reverse were true, i.e. equation (2) was replaced by
equation (2') the shadow value of biomass would appear in the discarding rule,
encouraging discarding and complicating the analysis.
Let us for convenience refer to the expression
CLi(y(i) - 0,0 - Pii) - CD/Q,i) (9)
as the discarding function for grade /. If the discarding function for a particular
grade is positive, marginal catch of that grade is discarded. If VU) is negative,
catch of grade / is retained. Notice that the discarding function is not equivalent
to the quantity discarded. It may, on the other hand, be interpreted as the ten-
dency to discard.
The discarding function shows that the optimal decision to discard depends
directly on (a) the quay price, (b) the marginal landing costs and (c) the marginal
discarding costs of the grade in question. It seems empirically likely that CL/(.v(O
- 0) is increasing in the catch rate, yii), at least for yii) above a certain level, ln
that case, the discarding function implies that the tendency to discard increases
with the catch rate. This, in fact, appears economically plausible. Moreover, as
catch increases monotonically with biomass and fishing effort, the tendency to
discard also generally increases with these variables, ceterisparibus. On the other
hand, the tendency to discard a particular grade diminishes with the price of
catch, p{i), and the marginal cost of discarding, C£>,/0). This also appears eco-
nomically plausible.
In an attempt to provide a partial visual image of the discarding function its
dependence on the price of catch is illustrated in Figure 1.
The discarding function as a function of grades is more interesting. This func-
tion may in principle have any shape. One example is illustrated in Figure 2. For
concreteness, the grades in Figure 2 may be thought of as fish size. The discarding
function drawn suggests discarding at small and large sizes with catch being




Figure 1. The discarding function: The effect of price.
The analysis so far suggests three seemingly interesting propositions concern-
ing optimal discarding:
Proposition 1
In an undifferentiated fishery discarding of catch is not optimal.
Proof:
In an undifferentiated fishery the number of catch grates is unity, 7=1.
Assume that ^(1) > 0. Then, according to (1.2), p{\) - CL,{\) - -CD^l).
Substituting this into (I.I) yields -(CDJ^l) + \x) • Y^{\) - Q ^ 0. But the right
hand side is actually strictly negative because profit maximization requires ^ ^ 0.
Consequently, by (I.I) e = 0. Thus, there is no catch to discard and d(\) = 0.'^
This contradiction proves the proposition.
Proposition 2
Discarding of catch may be socially optimal.
Proof:
This is immediate. For / ^ 2 it is clearly possible to select p(l), pi2), such that
f > 0 and F(2) > 0 for given x, CLfy{i) - 0,0 and CDj(O,/).
'^ It may be noted, however, that discarding might be positive if CD^ < 0, i.e. the act of
discarding is economically beneficial.196
Discarding Discarding
Figure 2. A discarding function.
Proposition 3
In a differentiated fishery no discarding may be optimal.
Proof:
Again, this proof is immediate. For a given number of grades, /, x, CLi(yii) -
0,0 and CD^0,0 simply increase all p{i) until TO) < 0 for all i.
Free Access, Competitive Fisheries
Let us now briefly consider discarding in a free access, competitive fishery.
Under this fisheries regime an arbitrary firm,y, will attempt to solve the following
problem:
Max f" Tr{eU),d(j),x\p) • exp(-rt)dt (II)
Subject to: x = Gix) - 2fc2,-r(^,^,0,
^{f)ydij) ^ 0,
where as before r denotes the rate of discount, eij) firm/s fishing effort, and x
biomass. p are (I x /) vectors of discarding and prices, respectively, correspond-
ing to different catch grades. TT(c(j),rf(/),.v,p) represents firm/s profit function
corresponding to equation (7) above. The summation, S^, is over all firms in the
industry.
A solution to this problem includes the discarding rule:
diiJ) > 0 if p(i) + CD/O,ij) < CL^Y(eU),x.iJ) - OJJ), all /. (10)
where d{ij) is firm j's discarding of catch of grade /.m
Comparing the competitive discarding rule, (10), with the socially optimal one,
(8) in the previous section shows that the two are formally identical. In fact,
formulating the social problem in terms of the same number of fishing firms yields
the same discarding rule.
This result is not difficult to understand. Competitive utilization offish stocks
deviates only from the optimal one due to the stock externality. The discarding
activity, at least as formulated here, does not generate any external effects.'^
Hence, competitive profit maximizing discarding rule should be optimal. It is
important to realize, however, that this does not mean that the level of compet-
itive discarding is socially optimal. Competitive discarding is only socially optimal
conditional upon the existing competitive catch and biomass levels. These, how-
ever, are generally sub-optimal as is well known.
Individual Transferable Quotas
We will now turn our attention to catch discarding under ITQ fisheries manage-
ment systems. We will first analyse the issue within the theoretically more con-
venient continuous ITQ system and then briefly consider discarding under a dis-
continuous ITQ system.
A Continuous ITQ System
Consider a continuous individual transferable quota (ITQ) system of the type
specified by Arnason (1990). The essentials of this system are as follows: The
fishing firms hold a stock of permanent ITQs. These ITQs refer to aggregate catch
volumes and are not differentiated according to grades. Let ^0) denote firm/s
quota holding by firmj at time t. At each point of time quota holdings must at least
equal the firm's rate of catch. However, if discards are not counted against quota,
as is in fact generally the case, firm's y instantaneous quota constraint is:
qU) ^ VdJ) ^ 5:,Lv(/j") - d{ij)], (11)
where l(ij) denotes the instantaneous landings of catch of grade / by firm j, y(ij)
the instantaneous catch and d{ij) the corresponding discard.
Quota holdings can be adjusted by trading, z, at a market price, s. Thus, quota
holdings move over time according to the equation:
q =z. (12)
Now, under quite unrestrictive assumptions, in particular that the quota price
is positive.''' the total quota (TAC) determined by the quota authority equals total
landings. The actual development of biomass, however, depends on natural
growth and total catches including discards. I.e.,
i = Gix) - Q - ^j^AUX (13)
'^ Discarding would, however, produce an externality (presumably a positive one) if some
fraction of discarded catch survived and thus constituted additions to the biomass.
'"See Arnason (1990).198
where Q represents the total quota issued and, as before, 2, denotes summation
over all firms in the fishery.
Within this management framework fishing firm j attempts to solve the fol-
lowing problem:
Max V = {' ['^{eU),dU).x;p) - s • z] • exp{-rt)dt (111)
Subject to: q = z,
X =G{x)-Q-
c'ii),di]) ^ 0,
where the instantaneous operating profit function for firmj, •Tr(eU),dQ),x;p)y is as
specified in (7) above.
It appears convenient to express a relevant current value Hamiltonian function
for this problem as:
H = 'nie(j),d(3),x;p) - s • z + M • z + h(J)(G(x) - Q - ,
I + nij) • {q - I,A'J)).
where \i(J) and 8(7) are costate variables or dynamic Lagrange multipliers corre-
sponding to the state variables q and x. respectively and Mj) is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the quota constraint. Along the optimal path u(j) mea-
sures the instantaneous marginal profits of quota holdings to the firm.
A solution to problem (III) includes the discarding rule for firm/'
0 if p{i) + CD^O,iJ) < CL,iY{e{f),x,ij) - O,iJ)
all (. (14)
This discarding rule is similar to the socially optimal and competitive ones ex-
pressed in equations (8) and (10) above. The only formal difference is the inclusion
ofthe two Lagrange multipliers, (7(7) and h{f), in (14).
The Lagrange multiplier, o-(j), represents the instantaneous imputed shadow
price or marginal value of quotas to firmj. Since quotas can be freely left unused,
maximization of profits requires this term to be nonnegative.'*' Thus, landing of
catch represents a cost to the firm amounting to (T(J). Hence, (j{f) normally en-
courages discarding of catch.
To provide another view on trifi it may be remarked that uij) equals the
opportunity cost of holding a unit of quota. More precisely, it can be shown that
^(j) = r s - dsldt. Now, s is the price of a permanent quota. Therefore, r • s
represents the instantaneous interest foregone by holding a unit of quota, some-
times called quota rental, ris/dt represents the capital gain (loss) of holding
" For the mathematical details consult the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, see e.g. Takayama
(1974).199
quota. In equilibrium CT(J') = r • S, where, of course, r • s' is the instantaneous or
the rental price of quota. Thus, in equilibrium, (T{J) is represents the instantaneous
gain foregone by using the quota for landings instead of discarding the catch and
renting the quota.
The other Lagrange multiplier, 8(j) represents firm/s shadow value of bio-
mass. More precisely. b(j) = dV{f)/dx. The appearance of this multiplier in the
discarding rule reflects the fact that in spite of the quota restriction, firmy can
influence the path of the biomass via discarding of catch. Since higher biomass is
normally economically beneficial to the firm,'^ 8(7) is usually positive. Hence, h(fi
represents a disincentive to discarding. 8(7). in other words, works against the
quota price incentive to discard represented by aij). In a fishery composed of
many firms, however, 8(7) is comparatively small. More precisely, in equilibrium
h{j) = aij) • (TiJ), where a{f) e 10,1] is firm/s share In the fishery.'^ Thus, for
many practical purposes 5(7) is negligible and may be ignored.
Let us now for convenience refer to the quantity (T(J) - h(f) as n(j). Q.{f) =
<j(j) - S(j'), thus represents the deviation of the discarding rule under an ITQ
system from the optimal one represented by (8) and (10). A positive ilif) repre-
sents an excessive incentive for discarding under an ITQ system and vice versa,
ln most commercial fisheries, fl{f) would be expected to be nonnegative. As
previously indicated, Hij) is closely related to the instantaneous quota price pro-
vided there is a reasonably large numbers of firms in the industry. In fact, in
equilibrium, il(j) is approximately equal to the present value of this price.
The ITQ discarding function corresponding to (14) is:
r(0 = CL^iO - 0,0 + il(j) - pii) - CDj{O,i). (15)
Since il(J) is normally positive there is. for any given level of catch and price. y(i)
and pii), an added incentive for a profit maximizing firm / to discard catch under
an ITQ system compared to what is socially optimal and a profit maximizing firm
would elect to do under a competitive fisheries regime."* Alternatively we may
say that the discarding function under an ITQ system, for given levels of p(i) and
yii) strictly dominates the socially optimal one.
We formalize this result as the following proposition:
Proposition 4
Under the ITQ system described above and when there is more than one fishing
firm there is generally an excessive incentive for discarding catch.
The result expressed in Proposition 4 is economically quite intuitive. Under a
competitive fisheries management regime, a fisherman contemplating whether or
not to retain a particular fish will obviously elect do so if the net return (measured
as the sum of its quay price and discarding costs less the landings costs) is pos-
itive. Under an ITQ system, this net return must be compared to the alternative
benefits of discarding the fish and selling the corresponding quota. More pre-
cisely, the net return of landing the fish must exceed the quota price.
"• Y^ie,x) > 0.
'^ For arguments to this effect see Arnason (1990) pp. 634-5.
'" As evidenced by equations (9) and (10).Notice, however, that the result expressed in Proposition 4 does not neces-
sarily mean that there will be excessive discarding under an ITQ system. There
may be comer solutions. This means that if there is no discarding under a com-
petitive fisheries management regime, there may possibly be no discarding under
an ITQ system as well. On the other hand, if there is discarding under a compet-
itive regime, there will almost certainly be excessive discarding under an ITQ
system.
Why does the ITQ system that is designed to eliminate the common property
problem in fisheries by allocating private property rights introduce a new ineffi-
ciency in the form of excessive catch discarding? The problem does not appear to
be the ITQ system as such. The problem appears to derive from the imperfectness
of the quota property rights as modelled in this paper or, alternatively, the en-
forcement of these rights.
To the extent that the quota restriction applies to landings rather than catch,
the quota property rights are incomplete. Enforcing the quota restriction by mon-
itoring landings is clearly a case of regulating the wrong target. Fishing firms can
still impose stock externalities on each other by discarding catch. In that way they
undermine the economic value of the quota property rights. The situation is not
dissimilar to a property rights system on land where theft is illegal but vandalism
is allowed.
To the extent that the ITQs refer to the aggregate volume of catch, the asso-
ciated property rights are also incomplete in another respect. Different grades of
catch represent economically different commodities. Quotas, on the other hand.
are not differentiated by grades. Consequently, different grades of catch cannot
correspond to different quota prices. This, of course, is the familiar problem of
missing markets. The theoretical solution is to issue quotas by grades.''* This,
however, may not be practical.
Comparison of the discarding rules under the competitive and the ITQ regimes
suggests that empirical inferences on the basis of observed differences in discard-
ing are by no means straight-forward. Discarding depends inter alia on vessel
catch rates and fish prices. Both of these may differ across the two management
regimes. Compared to a competitive arrangement, an ITQ managed fishery may
be expected to involve a higher catch rate per vessel. If the landings cost function,
CL{1), is convex, this induces a higher rate of discards under the ITQ fishery. This
increase, by itself, is not, evidence of excessive discarding. On the contrary. It
may, in fact, be socially optimal. Clearly, this observation has significant impli-
cations for the design of official campaigns to curtail discarding of catch.
A Discontinuous ITQ System
Most actual ITQ systems are not continuous. Continuous ITQ systems are simply
not very practical. In most ITQ systems the quota restriction only constrains the
integral of catches over a period of time. Moreover, the quota holdings are only
adjusted for catch at the time of landing. This particular practice of ITQ systems
slightly modifies but does not materially affect the results derived above. We will
now briefly investigate this:
'^ This was in fact suggested by Helgason (1989).201
Consider an ITQ system where the quota constraint has to be satisfied at the
time of landing. Under this kind of a discontinuous ITQ system the profit function
for a fishing trip lasting for the period [0,7] may be written as:
•IT - -LpiT) • UT) • exp{~rT) ~ ;J[C£(e) 4- UCL(y - d) + CD{d))
+ s • z] • exp{-rt)dt, (16)
where to simplify the notation redundant indices and arguments have been sup-
pressed.
The variables e, d(i), i = 1,2,../, and z in (16) are control variables. /(/), qit)
and x(t) are state variables. /(/) now represents the accumulated retained catch at
time t. Clearly l,j?ii,T) • l{i,T) is the value of the landed catch at time T and
X^(7) • l(T) • exp(-rT) the corresponding present value. q{t) represents the
quota holding at time t and x(t) the biomass level. However, as the shadow value
of the biomass normally plays a minimal role in the behaviour of private firms,""
we will ignore the biomass constraint in what follows. The integral in (16) repre-
sents the present value of operating costs during the fishing trips including the
costs of retaining and discarding catch of the various grades.
During the fishing trip /(/) clearly accumulates according to the equation:
X,dl(tydt = Uy(e,x,i) ~ d{i)] (17)
The path of quota holdings, q{t), is given by (12) above. The quota constraint
is now simply the terminal condition:
qiT) ^ 2,/(/,r). (18)
Firm 7 seeks to adjust e(j), d(j) and z{J) to maximize (16) subject to the con-
straints expressed in (12), (17) and (18) and the nonnegativity constraints
(j),rf(j) ^ 0.
The solution to this problem includes the discarding ^'
0 if CL^ii) - 0) - CD^CO > ^(0 - a(D] • exp{-r{T - /)), all /,
(19)
where u{T) is the shadow value of the quota constraint at time T.
The discarding rule expressed in (19) slightly modifies the discarding rule for
the continuous ITQ system discussed above. The modification consists of the
addition of the discount factor exp{-r{T - /)). This term clearly increases in /.
Thus, according to (19), the tendency to discard is at a maximum at the beginning
of a fishing trip and diminishes as the time of landing approaches. This appears to
be economically plausible. At the landing time, / = T, the quota constraint be-
comes effective and the two discarding rules (19) and (14) coincide.
^'* See the arguments concerning 5{i) in the previous subsection.
^' Another noteworthy feature of the maximizing solution is that quota holdings during
fishing trips require thai the quota price path follows the Hotelling rule, i.e., dsldt = r • s.202
Numerical Examples
The socially optimal discarding function is given by equation (9):
r(0 = CL,iy{i) - 0,0 - p(0 - CDJ.Q,i) (9)
Similarly, the discarding function for the continuous ITQ system is given by
equation (15):
= CL,(y{i) - 0,0 + n{J) - pii) - CD/0,0, (15)
where, ignoring firm /s imputed value of biomass, Cl{j) represents the firm's
shadow value of quota. To illustrate the application of this equation let us resort
to some simplifying assumptions.
The instantaneous profit function of firmy under an ITQ system may be writ-
ten as:
/(/) - CEie) - 2,(CI.(/(0,0 - CDid{O,i) - s • z
Now, landings correspond to quota use. This latter variable has been previ-
ously referred to as q. Clearly,
2,7(0 ^ 2,-(>'(0 - d{i)) ^ q.
Consequently, we may write the instantaneous marginal profits of quota use as:
/) • dl{i)ldq - CE^ - l.iCLi • dl{i)tdq.
where C£^, = CE^ • de/dq, where e = EiXiy(i),\) is the fishing effort necessary to
harvest the total volume of landings, 2,7(0.
Ignoring capital gains and losses on quota holdings, the firm's instantaneous
marginal profits of quota use equals its instantaneous shadow value. More pre-
cisely:
= d-n/dq
Now, the term dKi)/dq indicates the grade distribution in the marginal aggregate
landings, q. Clearly, 2, dl{i)Idq = 1. Consequently the {dl{i)/dq)s are weights.
Correspondingly we define the (landings) weighted averages:
= 2,-CL, •203
Given all this, we may rewrite fi(y) as
= p° - CEg - CL;.
Substituting this expression for O.(f) in (15), firm/s discarding function may be
rewritten as:
no = [p° - pU)] - [CL,%i) - Ct,(i)] - C^ - CD^i), (15')
According to (15'), the decision to discard function depends on four sets of
variables; (a) the price of landings of grade / compared to the weighted average
price over ail grades, (b) the handling and landing costs of grade i compared to the
weighted average of this cost over all grades, (c) the marginal cost of harvesting
and (d) the marginal cost of discarding. In accordance with economic intuition, the
tendency to discard catch of grade i decreases with its price, marginal harvesting
costs and discarding costs and increases with its handling and landing costs.
Let us now employ (15') to illustrate further the quantitative nature of the
discarding function under the ITQ management regime. For the purpose of illus-
tration let us assume that the cost terms in (15') are all independent of grades as
follows:
Q = «-p°, aG[O,n (i)
Ci)rf(O = fc-p°, 6E[0,l] (ii)
[CLAO - CLi^m =c-p°,cS [0,1] (iU)
Given these assumptions, it is a simple matter to calculate the p(i)/p'^ ratios that
make the discarding function zero. The relevant equation is:
p(i)/p° = 1 - a - b - c. (20)
Plugging the appropriate values for the parameters a, b and c into this equation
yields the p{i)lp° ratio that makes the discarding function zero. Thus, for instance
assuming that for a specific grade a = 0.4, b = 0.1 and c = O.I, equation (20)
yields p(i)/p° = 0.4. This means that the fisher would be indifferent between
keeping and discarding fish of this grade if the price was 40% of the weighted
average price over all grades. A slightly lower/?(/) would imply discarding.
For a final illustration, let us compare examples of discarding functions for the
two management regimes, i.e., the competitive fishery defined by equation (9),
and the ITQ managed fishery defined by equation (15'). For this purpose let us
consider a stylized version ofthe Icelandic cod fishery.
The Icelandic cod fishery consists of many year classes. Landing prices de-
pend inter alia on fish size. In fact, the smallest fish, consisting of the youngest
year classes fetch a very low price at the quay side. In addition, the very large
cod, being difficult to process, also carries a slight negative price premium. In the204
Icelandic cod fishery, approximate values for the relevant entries in the two
dis9arding functions may be taken to be:"~
= a • p^ a - 0.4 (i)
= b-p\b^ 0.01 (ii)
CL/,0 ^ d-p°,d=- 0.2 (iii)
= c-p\c=^ 0.0 (iv)
Given these specifications, we may rewrite the discarding functions for the com-
petitive and the ITQ fishery respectively as follows:
(9')
= 0.59 - piiVp\
Note that the dependent variable of these two equations, TUVp", has the con-
venient property of being independent of units of measurement. We refer to this
variable as the discarding value. A positive discarding value implies discarding of
that particular grade and vice versa. More generally, the numerical value ofthe
discarding value may be regarded as a measure ofthe tendency to discard or keep
catch of the grade in question.
Data on cod prices by cod size may be obtained from official and private fish
market sources." Given these estimates of the p{i)/p° ratio, discarding values for
this stylized example ofthe Icelandic cod fishery are easily calculated. The results
are illustrated in Figure 3.
As shown in Figure 3, the ITQ discarding function strictly dominates the
competitive one. ln fact the difference is quite pronounced. In this respect, how-
ever, the very approximate nature of both our model and the quantitative data
should be kept in mind. Due to gear selectivity in the Icelandic cod fishery very
few cod younger than 3 years are actually caught. Consequently there appears to
be very little tendency to discard even under the ITQ system. This is in accor-
dance with the available measurements on discarding in the Icelandic cod fishery
discussed in the introduction to this paper.
Potential Remedies
The usual ITQ fisheries management systems create a tendency for excessive
discarding of catch. The magnitude ofthe inefficiency depends on the parameters
of the situation but may be substantial. Excessive discarding of a particular grade
offish generally decreases with the relative price ofthe grade and harvesting and
^^ The parameter values employed are based broadly on official publications on the eco-
nomics ofthe Icelandic cod fishery. See especially National Economic Institute (1991) and
the Fisheries Association (1992).
^' These data are only to a limited extent available in official publications but may be
obtained from e.g. Verdlagsrad Sjavarutvegsins and Faxamarkadur.205
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Figure 3. Discarding functions for two management regimes: A stylized version of the
Icelandic cod fishery.
discarding costs. It increases, on the other hand, with the relative handling and
landing costs of the grade in question.
Three rather obvious remedies of the discarding problem may be suggested:
tTQs By Grades
If ITQs are issued for each grade, the quota price for each grade will reflect the
relevant economics of harvesting, processing and marketing that grade. In that
case, the quota prices will never induce excessive discarding of catch. For in-
stance for a marginal grade—i.e. a grade that would be marginally discarded under
a competitive fishery—the quota price would obviously be zero. Hence, the quota
price would constitute no extra incentive to discard that catch.
The issue of ITQs by grades, however, is hardly a practical solution in most
cases. There are many problems. First, the grades may be numerous and probably
time variant as well. Second, as the number of grades increases, the market for
each may become very thin. Third, enforcement of quota rights by grades may
easily prove prohibitively costly.
Nevertheless, ITQs by catch grades appear to constitute an interesting option.
In some fisheries, especially those with few, easily detectable grades, such a
system may turn out to be beneficial.
Taxes and Subsidies
Catch discarding is an externality problem. Therefore, the Pigovian solution of
imposing the appropriate taxes and subsidies may be economically justified.206
The construction of such a tax system must be done with proper care, how-
ever. In particular, reduction of the quota price by imposing landings or quota use
taxes is probably not going to work. The reason is that this method reduces both
sides of the discarding inequality, i.e. p(i) and Q(i) equally. On the other hand
property taxes on quota values or selective price subsidies on inferior grades will
in theory do the trick. The problem, as always in the case of Pigovian taxes, is to
select the (approximately) correct tax or subsidy rate.^*
Enforcement
Excessive discarding may be regarded as violation of fishery property rights. In
fact, irrespective of whether it is excessive or not, discarding often seems to be
regarded as such. From this point of view, the problem becomes one of enforce-
ment. The problem of the enforcer is to select the socially optimal combination of
enforcement effort and sanctions. This raises a range of issues. For instance, to be
able to select the socially optimal combination of enforcement effort and sanctions
the enforcer must know the response function of the fishing firms to enforcement
activity. Since this information requires, among other things, measurements of the
actual level of discarding, it is in genera! very hard to come by. A more promising
approach is to attempt the design of a market generated enforcement activity.
Given the intricacies of the discarding problem it appears unlikely that one
general solution exists. It may well be the best practical line of action is to employ
a mix of some or all of the methods discussed above.
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